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Abstract
We analyze a relation between interest rate controls and equilibrium de-
terminacy using a two-country model featuring traded and non-traded goods.
In addition, parameters of preference and production may di®er between the
two countries. We ¯nd that macroeconomic stability strongly depends on
such heterogeneity including monetary policy, and that it is easier to generate
determinate equilibrium under liberalization of the economy.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze equilibrium determinacy of a two-country model with
traded and non-traded goods in which the monetary authority in each country may
adopt di®erent interest rate control rules, and the countries can have asymmetric
production technologies and preferences.
There are a considerable number of studies concerning the stabilization e®ect
of interest rate control rules in open economy settings that utilize small country
models. For example, Chang, Chen, Lai, and Shaw (2008) examine an AK growth
economy with a generalized Taylor rule in which the central bank controls nominal
interest rate in response not only to in°ation but also to the growth rate of income. 1
They show that the number of equilibrium paths is less than one, that is, equilibrium
is determinate or source. 2 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999), Kam (2004 and 2007),
and Zanna (2003 and 2004) examine small-open economy models with Taylor-type
monetary policy under sticky prices.
The role of interest rate controls in a world economy model with two-countries
also has been extensively discussed in the literature. The New Keynesian models
in Batini, Levine and Pearlman (2004); Benigno and Benigno (2006); Bullard and
Schalling (2009); De Fiore and Liu (2005); and Airaudo and Zanna (2012a) are
based on Clarida, Gal¶³, and Gertler (2002). In these models with sticky price and
monopolistic competition, preferences and production parameters are assumed to
be identical in both countries, and the results are not analytically clear.
Moreover, non-traded goods are often ignored in open economy models. This is
1Such a monetary policy rule is also formalized in Fujisaki and Mino (2007).
2However, we should note that they assume sticky nominal interest rate.
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because the law of one price is plausible only for traded goods and thus the non-
arbitrage condition is described simply as the equivalence of real interest rates. For
instance, Ono (2006) considers a two-country economy in which all goods are trad-
able, the utilities of consumption and money are additively separable, production is
linear in labor and involuntary unemployment can emerge. He focuses on monetary
policy such that the growth rate of real money balances equals to the de°ation rate,
that is, nominal money holdings are constant. Fujisaki (2012) revises his model by
using an interest-rate control rule, and the utility of money need not be additively
separable from consumption. The results mainly depend on the heterogeneity of
interest rate controls and preferences, whereas productivity plays a limited role.
In order to check the robustness of the result and to obtain its implications for
the openness of the economy, we construct a two-country version of the model in
Airaudo and Zanna (2012b). They investigate small-country models with Taylor-
type monetary policy 3 and they distinguish non-traded goods from tradable ones. If
a continuous-time setting is used in their models, we only recon¯rm the well-known
results established in closed economy models: Taylor principle holds, which means
that interest-rate control with an aggressive response to the rate of in°ation gen-
erates equilibrium determinacy. They utilize discrete-time models for investigating
the e®ect of timings of monetary dynamics 4 on equilibrium determinacy. In or-
der to focus on heterogeneity between two countries, we assume a continuous-time
model. That is, each country responds independently to its own in°ation rate using
3A liquidity trap in which nominal interest rates cannot be negative is considered in Airaudo
and Zanna (2004).
4For instance, monetary authority controls the current nominal interest rate in response to
either the contemporaneous or forward-looking in°ation rate.
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interest rate controls, and parameters such as elasticities of labor used in production
and intertemporal substitution may di®er between the two countries. We suppose
that production functions can be non-linear in labor by assuming a ¯xed productive
factor as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999).
Using the Keynesian model with capital, McKnight (2011a) shows that real
indeterminacy is considerably easier to obtain once trade liberalization is permitted.
However, as his other papers McKnight (2011b) and McKnight and Mihailov (2007),
they generally conclude that Taylor principle tends to hold regardless of the openness
of the economy, and parameters about preferences and production in these models
are assumed to be the same in both countries.
We show that heterogeneity has a signi¯cant e®ect on equilibrium determinacy
and thus an appropriate combination of monetary policy is necessary to stabilize the
world economic system. This does not necessarily mean that central banks in both
countries should aggressively control nominal interest rates in response to in°ation.
Rather, passive monetary policy in one country may play a role for realizing the
stable economy. Such results are similar to those in Fujisaki (2012), who assumes
two kinds of tradable goods. In this paper, we consider the e®ect of non-traded
goods that violates the law of one price. Then, the non-arbitrage condition may
not imply the equivalence of real interest rates, and thus it becomes di±cult to
hold both the non-arbitrage condition and traded-goods equilibrium, which can be
a source of indeterminacy. When non-traded goods do not exist, we can hardly
assess macroeconomic stability only by preference and monetary policy, so that
the heterogeneity of productivity becomes more signi¯cant. Liberalization might
be e®ective for macroeconomic stability in that indeterminate equilibrium can be
3
determinate by being all goods tradable.
2 The Model
2.1 Households in Country 1
We assume that there are two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, in the world
economy. They produce and consume tradable and non-traded goods. Additionally,
the structure of the economy in the two countries is similar, although they di®er in
the values of some parameters for preferences, production, and monetary policy. Our
purpose is to investigate the e®ect of such heterogeneity on equilibrium determinacy.
We examine the structure of Country 1's economy. The consumer price index
(CPI) p, the CPI-in°ation rate ¼, and the price of traded-goods relative to non-
traded goods' ~P are
p ´
µ
P T
®
¶®µ
PN
1¡ ®
¶1¡®
; ¼ = ®¼T + (1¡ ®)¼N ; (1)
~P =
P T
PN
; (2)
where ¼T ´
_P T
P T
µ
resp. ¼N ´
_PN
PN
¶
is the in°ation rate of the price of traded goods
P T (resp. non-traded goods PN) expressed in domestic currency, and ® 2 (0; 1] is
the proportion of tradable goods among all commodities consumed in the country.
The production functions of traded and non-traded goods are respectively
yT = (lT )µ
T
(LT )1¡µT ; yN = (lN)µN (LN)1¡µN ; 0 < µN < 1; 0 < µT < 1;
where lT and lN are labor, and LT and LN are ¯xed factors. This formulation follows
Airaudo and Zanna (2012b) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999). In the following, we
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suppose that the rent from the ¯xed factor is distributed to household and that
LT = LN = 1. Then, income distribution is described as follows:
yT = wT lT + hT ; yN = wN lN + hN ;
where wT =
µTyT
lT
is a wage of labor and hT = (1 ¡ µT )yT is the rent from ¯xed
factor for traded goods. (Notation of non-traded goods is similar. )
The budget constraint of representative household in nominal terms is
_B + _M = RB + P T (yT ¡ cT ) + PN(yN ¡ cN);
where B denotes bonds, M nominal money holdings, R the nominal interest rate,
cT and cN (resp. yT and yN) consumption (resp. output) of the tradable and non-
traded goods. (We assume zero lump-sum taxes. ) Employing notation z ´ Z
p
that
evaluates a nominal variable Z in real terms and a ´ b+m as real ¯nancial assets,
we can describe
_B + _M ¡RB
PN
p
p
=
p
PN
( _a+ ¼a¡R(a¡m));
because
_B + _M
p
=
_A
p
= _a+ ¼a:
Using
p
PN
=
~P®
®®(1¡ ®)1¡®
from (1) and (2), we obtain the budget constraint in real terms as
_a = (R¡ ¼)a¡Rm+ ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®[ ~P (yT ¡ cT ) + (yN ¡ cN)]: (3)
The maximization problem of the representative household in Country 1 is
max
Z 1
0
u(c;m; lT ; lN)e¡½tdt; ½ > 0;
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subject to (3), where ½ is the time discount rate and c is the consumption aggregator
given by
c = (cT )®(cN)1¡®; 0 < ® · 1: (4)
Additionally, the instantaneous utility is speci¯ed as
u(c;m; lT ; lN) =
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
1¡ ¾ + Ã(1¡ l
T ¡ lN); 0 < ° < 1; ¾ > 0; Ã > 0;
where ¾ indicates an inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES
hereafter) 5.
Then, the Hamiltonian function for household's optimization is
H = (c
°m1¡°)1¡¾
1¡ ¾ + Ã(1¡ l
T ¡ lN)+
¸f(R¡ ¼)a¡Rm+ ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®[ ~P (yT ¡ cT ) + (yN ¡ cN)]g;
where ¸ denotes the shadow value of assets. The ¯rst-order conditions are
°®
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
cT
= ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P 1¡®¸; (5)
°(1¡ ®)(c
°m1¡°)1¡¾
cN
= ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®¸; (6)
(1¡ °)(c
°m1¡°)1¡¾
m
= ¸R; (7)
®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P 1¡®¸µT (lT )¡(1¡µT ) = ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®¸µN(lN)¡(1¡µN ) = Ã; (8)
_¸ = [½+ ¼ ¡R]¸; (9)
together with the transversality condition, lim
t!1
e¡½t¸tat = 0. We can rewrite these
conditions in the following simpler manner:
°
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
c
= ¸; (10)
5We can consider a more general form of disutility from labor in which the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply is not zero. Nevertheless, this is not essential so long as
the marginal disutility is increasing in labor.
6
Ã°®(c°m1¡°)1¡¾=cT
= µT (lT )¡(1¡µ
T ); (11)
Ã
°(1¡ ®)(c°m1¡°)1¡¾=cN = µ
N(lN)¡(1¡µ
N ); (12)
(1¡ °)=m
°=c
= R; (13)
~P
cT
cN
=
®
1¡ ® : c =
µ
1¡ ®
®
~P
¶1¡®
cT =
µ
1¡ ®
®
~P
¶¡®
cN ; (14)
~P =
µN(lN)¡(1¡µ
N )
µT (lT )¡(1¡µT )
: (15)
The market equilibrium condition for non-traded goods is
yN = cN ; (16)
while that for traded-goods is
yT + yT¤ = cT + cT¤; (17)
where yT¤ and cT¤ are production and consumption, respectively, of traded goods
in Country 2 presented in the next subsection. From (10)-(16) and the fact that
yT can deviate from cT since (yT ¡ cT ) is net export, important variables can be
described as functions of R and ¸;
c = C(R(1¡°)(1¡¾)¸)¡ 1¾ ; (18)
m =
1¡ °
°
CR¡ 1¡°+°¾¾ ¸¡ 1¾ ; (19)
yN = cN = (lN)µ
N
= NN (R1¡°¸)¡ 1¡¾¾ µN ; (20)
yT = (lT )µ
T
= N T (RÁ1¸Á2) µ
T
1¡µT ; (21)
cT =
µ
c
(cN)1¡®
¶ 1
®
= CTRÂ1¸Â2 ; (22)
~P = P(Rº1¸)º2 ; (23)
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where
C ´ ° ¾(1¡°)+°¾ (1¡ °) (1¡°)(1¡¾)¾ ;
NN ´
½
(1¡ ®)µ
N
Ã
°
µ
1¡ °
°
¶(1¡°)(1¡¾)
C1¡¾
¾ 1
µN
;
N T ´
·
®®(1¡ ®)1¡®µT (P)1¡®
Ã
¸ µT
1¡µT
;
CT ´
· C
NN
¸ 1
®
;
P ´
·
®®(1¡ ®)1¡®µN(NN )¡ 1¡µ
N
µN
Ã
¸ 1
®
;
are positive constants and
Á1 ´ º1º2(1¡ ®); Á2 ´ 1¡ [µ
N + ®(1¡ µN)](1¡ ¾)
¾®
> 0;
Â1 ´ ¡(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)[1¡ µ
N(1¡ ®)]
¾®
; Â2 ´ ¡1¡ [µ
N(1¡ ®)(1¡ ¾)]
¾®
< 0;
º1 ´ (1¡ °)(1¡ µ
N)(1¡ ¾)
1¡ µN(1¡ ¾) ; º2 ´
1¡ µN(1¡ ¾)
¾®
> 0:
Properties of these variables are shown in Table 1. Any type of consumption
increases with higher nominal interest rate when ¾ > 1, that is, consumption and
real money balances are substitutes, since nominal interest rate represents an oppor-
tunity cost of holding money. This means higher relative marginal utility of leisure
to that of traded goods' consumption so that marginal productivity of labor as the
opportunity cost for enjoying leisure should rise. Therefore, the output decreases,
in contrast to the production of non-traded goods equivalent to the consumption,
and thus the tradable goods' relative price must be lower to satisfy the equation for
the marginal values of product (15).
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2.2 Households in Country 2
We represent variables and parameters in Country 2 by using asterisks, such as µN¤,
µT¤ and ¾¤. We allow that µN 6= µN¤, µT 6= µT¤ and ¾ 6= ¾¤. Since the structure
of the economy is similar to that of Country 1 in that the forms of utility and
production are identical, and since we allow the equivalence of parameters ½, ® and
Ã between two countries, the Hamiltonian of utility maximization by Country 2's
household is
H¤ = ((c
¤)°
¤
(m¤)1¡°
¤
)1¡¾
¤
1¡ ¾¤ + Ã(1¡ l
T¤ ¡ lN¤) + ¸¤f(R¤ ¡ ¼¤)a¤ ¡R¤m¤ ¡ ¿ ¤
+ ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P ¤¡®[ ~P ¤(yT¤ ¡ cT¤) + (yN¤ ¡ cN¤)]g:
The CPI expressed in Country 2's own currency is p¤ ´
µ
P T¤
®
¶®µ
PN¤
1¡ ®
¶1¡®
and
~P ¤ =
P T¤
PN¤
denotes the relative price. Supposing that the quantities of ¯xed pro-
ductive factors LT¤ = LN¤ = 1 and that the rent is again distributed to households,
we can solve the above Hamiltonian as in the previous subsection. 6 Moreover,
non-traded goods' market equilibrium in this country is
yN¤ = cN¤
so that the reduced forms and properties of variables are the same as those displayed
by (18)-(23) and Table 1, except that there are asterisks on variables and some
parameters. For example, the relative price in Country 2 is
~P ¤ = P¤((R¤)º¤1¸¤)º¤2 ; (24)
where
C¤ ´ ° ¾
¤(1¡°)+°
¾¤ (1¡ °) (1¡°)(1¡¾
¤)
¾¤ ;
6The transversality condition is lim
t!1 e
¡½t¸¤ta
¤
t = 0.
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NN¤ ´
½
(1¡ ®)µ
N¤
Ã
°
µ
1¡ °
°
¶(1¡°)(1¡¾¤)
C¤1¡¾¤
¾ 1
µN¤
;
P¤ ´
·
®®(1¡ ®)1¡®µN¤(NN¤)¡ 1¡µ
N¤
µN¤
Ã
¸ 1
®
;
º¤1 ´
(1¡ °)(1¡ µN¤)(1¡ ¾¤)
1¡ µN¤(1¡ ¾¤) ; º
¤
2 ´
1¡ µN¤(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤®
> 0:
2.3 Monetary Policy and Interest-Rate Condition
The central bank in each country adjusts nominal interest rate in response to the
CPI in°ation rate in its country: 7
R = R(¼) = ´¼(¼ ¡ ¹¼) + ¹R; ´¼ ¸ 0;
R¤ = R¤(¼¤) = ´¤¼(¼
¤ ¡ ¹¼¤) + ¹R¤; ´¤¼ ¸ 0;
where ¹¼ and ¹¼¤ are the target rates of in°ation in Country 1 and 2, respectively. 8
We rewrite these policy rules in the following manner:
¼ = ¼(R); ¼0(R) =
1
´¼
; (25)
¼¤ = ¼¤(R¤); ¼¤
0
(R¤) =
1
´¤¼
: (26)
Under this formulation, we de¯ne active (resp. passive) monetary policy as ´¼ > 1
or ´¤¼ > 1 (resp. ´¼ < 1 or ´
¤
¼ < 1), which implies that the real interest rate is higher
(resp. lower) with in°ation. We assume heterogeneity in the response of interest
7There are several types of Taylor rule that respond not only to in°ation but also to an output
gap as in Taylor's (1993) original idea or depreciation rate of currency as in Ball (1998). We do
not introduce this expansion into a framework of this paper, as it cannot be bene¯cial except that
it renders the model analytically di±cult and thus greater variation in results may be expected.
8Around the steady state, ½ = ¹R¡¹¼ = ¹R¤¡¹¼¤ hold from equation (9) and _¸¤ = [½+¼¤¡R¤]¸¤.
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rate controls to in°ation as well as in production and preferences, that is, we allow
´¼ 6= ´¤¼.
The interest-parity condition is
R = ²+R¤; (27)
where ² ´ _"
"
is a depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate ". The law of one
price holds for traded goods so that
" =
P T
P T¤
; ¼T = ²+ ¼T¤: (28)
For example, the prices of traded goods are P T yen in Japan and P T¤ dollars in the
United States if the exchange rate is $1 =U".
From (1), ¼¤ = ®¼T¤ + (1¡ ®)¼N¤, and (23)¡(28), we obtain
r(R) = r(R¤) + (1¡ ®)
·
º1º2
_R
R
¡ º¤1º¤2
_R¤
R¤
+ º2
_¸
¸
¡ º¤2
_¸¤
¸¤
¸
; (29)
where r(R) = R¡ ¼(R) and r¤(R¤) = R¤ ¡ ¼¤(R¤). We can interpret this equation
as a non-arbitrage condition with non-traded goods. A higher real interest rate
improves the capital account and thus trade balance as current account should
worsen in order to balance total international payments. This is realized when the
relative price of traded goods to non-traded as a bene¯t of trade declines. That is,
equation (29) shows the equivalence of the e®ective rate of return from international
payment. If all goods are tradable (® = 1), we do not have to consider the di®erence
between non-traded and tradable goods presented by
(1¡ ®)
·
º1º2
_R
R
¡ º¤1º¤2
_R¤
R¤
+ º2
_¸
¸
¡ º¤2
_¸¤
¸¤
¸
;
and thus
r(R) = r¤(R¤) (30)
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is a non-arbitrage condition.
3 Equilibrium Determinacy
Using equation (17), (21), (22), and their corresponding equations for Country 2,
we obtain
YR
_R
R
+ Y¸
_¸
¸
= ¡Y¤R
_R¤
R¤
¡ Y¤¸
_¸¤
¸¤
; (31)
where
YR ´ µ
T
1¡ µT Á1y
T ¡ Â1cT ; Y¸ ´ µ
T
1¡ µT Á2y
T ¡ Â2cT > 0;
Y¤R ´
µT¤
1¡ µT¤Á
¤
1y
T¤ ¡ Â¤1cT¤; Y¤¸ ´
µT¤
1¡ µT¤Á
¤
2y
T¤ ¡ Â¤2cT¤ > 0;
sign[YR] = sign[1¡ ¾]; sign[Y¤R] = sign[1¡ ¾¤]:
Under the case where ¾ = ¾¤ = 1, the followings hold:
º1 = º
¤
1 = Á1 = Á
¤
1 = Â1 = Â
¤
1 = 0;
º2 = º
¤
2 = Á2 = Á
¤
2 = ¡Â2 = ¡Â¤2 =
1
®
> 0:
Therefore, r = r¤ holds from equation (29) and
¸
¸¤
is a constant. Additionally, the
traded-goods equilibrium shows the relation between ¸ and ¸¤ whether all goods
are tradable or not. Therefore, ¸ is uniquely determined regardless of policy stance
and openness of the economy. In the following, we focus on the case except that
¾ = ¾¤ = 1. 9
9We can also analyze the situation where either ¾ = 1 or ¾¤ = 1 holds by using discussion
below.
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3.1 Tradable Goods Only
The case where all goods are tradable (® = 1) is a special situation in that the real
interest rates are equivalent as in equation (30), since the bene¯t from the expensive
non-traded goods becomes zero. Then,
¸
¸¤
is a constant and the following holds:
R¤ = R¤(R); R¤
0
(R) =
´¤¼(´¼ ¡ 1)
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1)
;
_R¤
R¤
=
R¤
0
(R)R
R¤(R)
_R
R
; (32)
² = ²(R); ²
0
(R) = 1¡R¤0(R) = ´
¤
¼ ¡ ´¼
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1)
:
When
´¼ ¡ 1
´¤¼ ¡ 1
< 0, R and R¤ are negatively correlated, and the currency in
Country 1 appreciates to yield a lower nominal interest rate (i.e., in°ation rate)
in Country 1. If the central bank in Country 1 adopts passive monetary policy,
real interest rates in both countries become higher from the non-arbitrage condition
when the in°ation in Country 1 decreases. Under active interest rate control in
Country 2, this is accomplished by increasing the nominal interest rate in Country
2. From the interest-parity condition (27), it results in diminishing ², indicating
that currency in Country 1 is appreciated. This mechanism of currency °uctuation
suggests that the change in nominal interest rates does not a®ect the depreciation
of exchange rate ² if the strength of the response to in°ation in each country is
equivalent, ´¼ = ´
¤
¼.
If ® = 1, equations (31) and (32) hold, and thus the system equation is summa-
rized as a function of R,
_R =
c(R)
¾
+
c¤(R)
¾¤
+
µT
1¡ µT y
T (R) +
µT¤
1¡ µT¤y
T¤(R)
c(R)
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)
¾
+ c¤(R)
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤
R¤
0
(R)R
R¤(R)
[r(R)¡ ½]R; (33)
since
Á1 = Á
¤
1 = 0; Á2 = Á
¤
2 = 1;
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Â1 = ¡(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)
¾
; Â¤1 = ¡
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤
;
Â2 = ¡ 1
¾
< 0; Â¤2 = ¡
1
¾¤
< 0:
We evaluate this equation around the steady state in order to examine local deter-
minacy;
_RRjss =
c( ¹R)
¾
+
c¤( ¹R)
¾¤
+
µT
1¡ µT y
T ( ¹R) +
µT¤
1¡ µT¤y
T¤( ¹R)
c( ¹R)
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)
¾
+ c¤( ¹R)
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤
R¤
0
( ¹R) ¹R
¹R¤
[1¡ ¼0(R)] ¹R: (34)
As shown in the following propositions, the result is essentially the same in the case
investigated in Fujisaki (2012) where two kinds of goods are tradable:
Proposition 1 If the value of IES in a country is 1, another country's central bank
can make equilibrium determinate by using a policy rule such that (´¼¡1)(1¡¾) > 0
( or (´¤¼ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾¤) > 0).
Proposition 2 When the signs of both (´¼ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¾) and (´¤¼ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¾¤) are
positive (resp. negative), equilibrium is determinate (resp. indeterminate). If one of
these signs is positive and the other negative, either determinacy or indeterminacy
may emerge.
3.2 Including Non-Traded Goods
Next, we examine the generalized case where both traded and non-traded goods
exist (0 < ® < 1) to compare with the fully-open economy (® = 1) in the previous
subsection. In this case, we can summarize the system equations consisted by two
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jump variables, R and R¤:
_R = ¡ R
YR + Y¤R
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
½ Y¤R
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
¡r(R)¡ r
¤(R¤)
1¡ ® + º2(½¡ r(R))¡ º
¤
2(½¡ r¤(R¤))
¶
+ Y¸(½¡ r(R)) + Y¤¸(½¡ r¤(R¤))
¾
; (35)
_R¤ =
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
R¤
R
_R +
R¤
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
¡r(R)¡ r
¤(R¤)
1¡ ® + º2(½¡ r(R))¡ º
¤
2(½¡ r¤(R¤))
¶
: (36)
Detailed derivation is in Appendix. We linearize these equations around the steady
state and equilibrium is locally determinate if both detJ and traceJ are positive:
_xt = Jx^t;
where J =
264 _RR _RR¤
_R¤R _R¤R¤
375 =
2664
@ _Rt
@Rt
¯¯¯¯
ss
@ _Rt
@R¤t
¯¯¯¯
ss
@ _R¤t
@Rt
¯¯¯¯
ss
@ _R¤t
@R¤t
¯¯¯¯
ss
3775 and x^t =
264 Rt ¡ ¹R
R¤t ¡ ¹R¤
375. The charac-
teristic equation is
p(¹) = ¹2 ¡ A1¹+ A0;
where A1 = trace(J) = ¹1 + ¹2 = _RR + _R¤R¤ , and A0 = det(J) = ¹1¹2 =
_RR _R¤R¤ ¡ _RR¤ _R¤R. The followings are the components in the matrix J :
_RR =
¹R
YR + Y¤R
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
½ Y¤R
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
1
1¡ ® + º2
¶
+ Y¸
¾
r0( ¹R);
_RR¤ = ¡
¹R
YR + Y¤R
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
½ Y¤R
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
1
1¡ ® + º
¤
2
¶
¡ Y¤¸
¾
r¤
0
( ¹R¤);
_R¤R =
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¹R¤
¹R
_RR ¡
¹R¤
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
1
1¡ ® + º2
¶
r0( ¹R);
_R¤R¤ =
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¹R¤
¹R
_R¤R +
¹R¤
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
1
1¡ ® + º
¤
2
¶
r¤
0
( ¹R¤):
Therefore, the signs of trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix J are
sign[A1] = sign[trace(J)] = sign
·
r0( ¹R)
1¡ ¾ +
r¤
0
( ¹R¤)
1¡ ¾¤
¸
; (37)
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sign[A0] = sign[det(J)] = sign
·
r0( ¹R)
1¡ ¾ ¢
r¤
0
( ¹R¤)
1¡ ¾¤
¸
: (38)
Propositions below show the results in this case with non-traded goods:
Proposition 3 If either (´¼ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾) or (´¤¼ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾¤) is negative, equilibrium
is indeterminate. Otherwise, it is determinate.
3.3 Intuitive Mechanism of Determinacy
As summarized in Table 2, we ¯nd that coexistence of non-traded and tradable
goods can easily make equilibrium indeterminate.
Now, assume that interest-rate control rules in both countries are passive, that
¾ < 1, and that in°ation in Country 1 becomes lower. Then, the nominal rate
of interest as an opportunity cost for holding money falls so that consumption in
Country 1 which is complements of money increases. On the other hand, the real
interest rate rises and thus production in Country 1 is smaller, since the growth rate
of shadow value of real assets diminishes.
In a fully-opened economy, the real rate of interest in Country 2 is also higher
from the non-arbitrage condition, and the nominal rate falls. If consumption and
money are separable (i. e., ¾¤ = 1), the net export in Country 2 becomes lower,
which contradicts the traded-goods equilibrium so that indeterminacy holds. (This
discussion is similar to the case with non-traded goods. ) In contrast, if ¾¤ > 1,
consumption decreases and then the traded-goods equilibrium (and thus determi-
nacy) can be satis¯ed. This equilibrium holds more easily if ´¤¼ < 1 is enough high,
because a decrease of consumption becomes larger.
However, when the non-traded goods coexist, the relative in°ation between
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traded and non-traded goods in Country 1 is lower so that the non-arbitrage con-
dition is violated if the real interest rates are equivalent between the two countries.
Therefore, indeterminate equilibrium tends to emerge under an imperfect open econ-
omy, since it is hard to satisfy both the complicated non-arbitrage condition with
non-traded goods and equilibrium condition of the two types of goods.
4 Conclusion
We consider equilibrium determinacy in the economy which consists of two countries
with tradable and non-traded goods. Additionally, the countries are heterogeneous
in that parameters about preference, production and monetary policy of interest-rate
control type.
Liberalization of economy which means that a fraction of traded goods is close
to one can make equilibrium determinate under the case where equilibrium is inde-
terminate in the not-fully open economy. However, since full liberalization is not
pragmatic, central banks had better take an appropriate stance of monetary policy
according to the heterogeneity of economic structure such as preference and produc-
tion for realizing stable economy. We should note that active policy is not always
good and thus the international combination is required.
Introducing capital stock and ¯scal policy for a means of stabilizer as well as
monetary policy may be future research. Additionally, it may also be bene¯cial
to investigate the relation between social-status preference in open economy as in
Farmer and Lahiri (2005) and Valente (2006, 2009) and Taylor-type monetary policy.
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Appendix: Derivation of System Equations in Sec-
tion 3.2 (The Case Including Non-Traded Goods)
Combining equilibrium condition for bond market
b+ b¤ = 0;
and the budget constraints of households in both countries, and goods-market equi-
librium, we acquire the equilibrium condition for money:
_m+ _m¤ = ¡¼m¡ ¼¤m¤ + ®®(1¡ ®)1¡®(yT ¡ cT )[ ~P 1¡® ¡ ( ~P ¤)1¡®]: (39)
From (19) and the correspondence in Country 2, the equilibrium condition (39)
can be rewritten in the following:
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m
_R
R
+
1¡ ° + °¾¤
¾¤
m¤
_R¤
R¤
+M = 0; (40)
where
M´ m
¾
(½¡r(R))+m
¤
¾¤
(½¡r¤(R¤))¡¼(R)m¡¼¤(R¤)m¤+®®(1¡ ®)1¡®(yT¡cT )[ ~P 1¡®¡( ~P ¤)1¡®]:
Substituting (29) into (40), we obtain
_R
R
= ¡
µ
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m+
1¡ ° + °¾¤
¾¤
m¤
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¶¡1
¢·
1¡ ° + °¾¤
¾¤
m¤
1
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
¡r(R)¡ r
¤(R¤)
1¡ ® + º2(½¡ r(R))¡ º
¤
2(½¡ r¤(R¤))
¶
+M
¸
:
(41)
On the other hand, from (31) and
_R¤
R¤
=
µ
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m+
1¡ ° + °¾¤
¾¤
m¤
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¶¡1
¢·
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m
1
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
¡r(R)¡ r
¤(R¤)
1¡ ® +º2(½¡r(R))¡º
¤
2(½¡r¤(R¤))
¶
¡M º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¸
;
(42)
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the dynamic equation is
_R
R
= ¡
·
Y¤R
µ
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m+
1¡ ° + °¾¤
¾¤
m¤
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¶¡1
¢½
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m
1
º¤1º
¤
2
µ
¡r(R)¡ r
¤(R¤)
1¡ ® + º2(½¡ r(R))¡ º
¤
2(½¡ r¤(R¤))
¶
¡M º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¾
+ Y¸(½¡ r(R)) + Y¤¸(½¡ r¤(R¤))
¸
1
YR : (43)
Comparing (41) and (43), we ¯nd that
M
µ
YR + Y¤R
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¶
=
[Y¸(½¡ r(R)) + Y¤¸(½¡ r¤(R¤))]
µ
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m+
1¡ ° + °¾¤
¾¤
m¤
º1º2
º¤1º
¤
2
¶
+µ
¡YR1¡ ° + °¾
¤
¾¤
m¤
º¤1º
¤
2
+ Y¤R
1¡ ° + °¾
¾
m
º¤1º
¤
2
¶
¢µ
¡r(R)¡ r
¤(R¤)
1¡ ® + º2(½¡ r(R))¡ º
¤
2(½¡ r¤(R¤))
¶
; (44)
This equation suggests that ¸ is a function of R and R¤, since ¸¤ is the one of R,
R¤, and ¸ from the goods-market equilibrium.
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Table 1: Properties of Variables
~P yN = cN yT cT c m
R (1¡ ¾) ¡(1¡ ¾) (1¡ ¾) ¡(1¡ ¾) ¡(1¡ ¾) ?
¸ ? ¡(1¡ ¾) ? ? ? ?
ex) sign[ ~PR] =sign
·
@ ~P
@R
¸
= sign(1¡ ¾), ~P¸ > 0, and cT¸ < 0.
Table 2: Equilibrium Determinacy
(´¤¼ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾¤) > 0 ¾¤ = 1 (´¤¼ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾¤) < 0
(´¼ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾) > 0 (iii) (iii) (ii)
¾ = 1 (iii) (iii) (i)
(´¼ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¾) < 0 (ii) (i) (i)
(i) Indeterminate for any ® 2 (0; 1];
(ii) Determinate or Indeterminate if ® = 1, Indeterminate if 0 < ® < 1;
(iii) Determinate for any ® 2 (0; 1].
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